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David Bell’s The First Total War 
by Daniel Moran  
Strategic Insights is a bi-monthly electronic journal produced by the Center for Contemporary 
Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
A review of: David A Bell, The First Total War: Napoleon’s Europe and the Birth of Warfare as we 
Know It. Boston and New York: Houghton Mifflin, 2007. 
The comments below were presented as part of a round-table discussion of David Bell’s The First 
Total War, conducted at the bi-annual meeting of the Council of European Studies, held in 
Chicago on 5-9 March 2008. 
The outstanding features of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars in the eyes of 
contemporaries were their scale and ferocity. The former quality has been fully captured by 
modern historians, but the latter has rather faded from view. One of the merits of David Bell’s fine 
book is that he has restored ferocity to its proper place at the center of what was going on in 
Europe at the turn of the nineteenth century. 
Scale and ferocity were linked in some respects. The frequency and intensity of pitched battles 
during this period were partly a reflection of the ability of the post-Revolutionary French state to 
generate an unprecedented stream of fresh troops, which in turn allowed commanders to take 
tactical risks that their predecessors a generation earlier would have avoided; the most important 
of which was the new practice of ruthless pursuit, by which a beaten army would not merely be 
driven from the battlefield, but harried into dissolution over succeeding days or weeks. On the 
whole a Napoleonic battle resembled those of the past more than of the future. Battle remained a 
discontinuous, episodic experience, even as it became more frequent. Yet contemporary 
observers sensed that what might be called the psychology of defeat was changing—it was 
becoming more cataclysmic, more humiliating. These qualities in turn lent military victory a 
political decisiveness it had not previously possessed. 
Professor Bell’s book is also a reminder that the wars of the Revolution and the Empire had an 
“Eastern Front”—it just happened to be in the West and South: in the Vendée, Iberia, and Italy. In 
these regions the scale of the fighting was less distinctive than its viciousness, above all in the 
prominence, if not preeminence, of guerilla warfare—a term made commonplace by the war in 
Spain. In these areas, as Bell shows, massacre and atrocity were sufficiently pervasive that it is 
not reasonable to regard them as “excesses” or “exceptions.” They are very much the heart of the 
matter. 
Are they also the heart of the period as a whole? Should they properly preside, like Stalingrad or 
Auschwitz, over our understanding of the times in which they occurred? This is, roughly speaking, 
the challenge posed by the claim that the wars of the Revolution and Napoleon were, collectively, 
the first total war. And here I must confess to some embarrassment, because “total war” is a 
phrase I rarely use myself, and often warn my students against. This is awkward because there 
are now two books I must recommend to them that use this baleful expression on their covers, 
the other being the well-known history of the Second World War by Peter Calvocoressi and Guy 
Wint.[1] 
Calvocoressi and Wint felt no need to explain themselves. The war they were writing about had 
been called “total” while it was going on; and as a practical matter, whatever meaning we may 
assign to this expression, it must encompass a war in which as many as fifty million people may 
have died, the last few hundreds of thousands by means of weapons designed to unleash the 
forces by which the universe was created. Yet even the Second World War illustrates how 
markedly the conduct of total war may vary. The United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union all 
fought what they believed to be total war, and have been given credit for doing so by historians; 
yet they did not fight or experience the war in remotely similar ways. Part of the weakness of 
“total war” as an analytic concept is that it is less a statement about war than about the outlook 
and actions of individual belligerents, some of whom may be fighting (or seeking) total war while 
others are not. This question clearly arises in the period that Professor Bell studies. Such moral 
and material asymmetries are also apparent when strong countries fight much weaker ones, a 
subject to which I will return in a moment. 
In contrast to Calvocoressi and Wint, David Bell offers a good account, in his introduction, of the 
range of meanings that have accumulated around the idea of total war. Two elements stand out, 
however, as they must in any serious effort to come to grips with this concept: far-reaching (and 
ostensibly universal) social mobilization; and the widespread use of indiscriminate violence. This 
indiscriminancy is manifest above all in a disregard of the principle of non-combatant immunity, 
but also in the readiness of military leaders to disdain the lives of their own soldiers, an attitude 
that Bell attributes to Napoleon in particular. 
Professor Bell, as he says, is not the first to describe the wars of the Revolution and Napoleon as 
total war. But his explanation for their totality is new. He argues that the total wars of the 
Revolutionary era were rooted in the utopian pacifism of the late Enlightenment, whose longing 
for, and belief in the possibility of, perpetual peace, countenanced and legitimized unstinting 
violence: no sacrifice would be too great in behalf of such a goal, and even rivers of innocent 
blood would be redeemed by the future happiness of mankind. Bell demonstrates that such ideas 
played a prominent role in the politics of the Revolution, which began by proclaiming its 
determination to live in peace with Europe, only to conclude that such peace would not be 
possible until all its enemies were dead. Nevertheless, the wars that arose from this toxic 
ideological stew lasted a long time, and I am uncertain whether the ideas that assisted in their 
emergence also account for their longevity. I doubt that Napoleon cared much about perpetual 
peace, and I am certain his opponents did not, a statement that applies with equal force to the 
Habsburg emperor and to the peasantry of Iberia. 
Did the peasantry of Iberia fight total war? Certainly they did not shrink from the indiscriminate 
violence that is total war’s signal characteristic. Yet the idea of total war, to the extent that we 
wish to regard it as distinctively modern, can scarcely apply to the vernacular violence of the 
Spanish guerrillas, fighting to defend their homes, exact revenge, pillage the enemy’s stores, or 
simply repel the outsider. That they and their countrymen suffered total war seems fair enough; 
but the experience was basically familiar, even if the scale was new. The practices by which 
European states had controlled the mass of their subjects had always included precisely those 
forms of violence—mass reprisals, summary execution, hostage-taking, scorched earth, and so 
on—that, when applied on the international stage, bespoke an abandonment of all restraint, and a 
callous disregard for innocent life. 
It seems to me that it is from the arena of civil war and intra-communal violence that the rhetoric 
and reality of total war make their way into European politics. Europeans at the end of the 
eighteenth century had long since been accustomed to distinguishing between the violence that a 
prince might justly employ against a rebellious subject, and what he might do against another 
state and its subjects. The former was limited only by the mercy and prudence of God’s own 
lieutenant. The latter, however, was hedged round by complex theories about just recourse to war, 
the morally vicarious nature of military violence (which is all that distinguishes soldiers from 
murderers), the proportionality of ends and means, and so on. One does not need to imagine 
such ideas actively rattling around in the crowned heads of Europe to recognize their prominence 
in both the legal and the strategic theory of the Old Regime. 
In this respect I believe Professor Bell may sell his argument a little short. In his account of 
evolving Enlightenment attitudes toward war, he notes that the systematic distinction between the 
civil and military realms is a product of the last decades of the eighteenth century, an observation 
that is true of many other foundational concepts of modern social theory as well: the idea of the 
“public” and of “public opinion,” for instance, and of “society” itself, which is rarely regarded as a 
unitary, reified object of inquiry before this period. But even so, the principle of non-combatant 
immunity—the idea that there are classes of people who may not be justly killed in war—was 
perfectly familiar to medieval theorists of jus in bello, who looked back to the work of Saint 
Augustine. Although this observation may undermine Bell’s argument about the novelty of the 
ideological forces at work in the late eighteenth century, it also strengthens his claim about the 
transgressive nature of the violence unleashed by the Revolution: the older and more ingrained 
the norm that is being violated, the more profound the transgression. 
I also agree that the Enlightenment did its share to make the transgression possible, less through 
its speculations about perpetual peace than through its insistence that all of Europe had to be 
understood as a single community, which could only be governed fairly through the application of 
universal, putatively rational principles. In the minds of the French Revolutionaries, such ideas 
may have served as a kind of license to import into the conduct of international war attitudes and 
practices that had once been regarded as legitimate only in the suppression of crime and 
rebellion. That being so, there may be something to the idea that the wars of the Revolution and 
Napoleon, if not quite the first total war, may be the first European Civil War—the first, at any rate, 
to be fought on a largely secular basis. 
Still, in the final analysis I think the idea of total war has more to do with the power of the state—
its capacity to mobilize resources and compel sacrifice—than with social attitudes, however 
dystopian. This distinction is apparent in the latter stages of Napoleon’s rule, when the fires of the 
Revolution have long since burned to cinders, even as the war it engendered is reaching its 
culmination. War spreads across Europe in the Revolutionary era not simply because the 
Revolutionaries believed it was just and right that it should—though they did believe this—but 
because the Revolution itself afforded the French state unprecedented access to the human and 
material resources necessary to vindicate its newly inflamed ambitions. The war ends when the 
rest of Europe catches up; an old story, admittedly, but still the biggest piece of the puzzle as far 
as I can see. 
David Bell notes that, in characterizing the wars of the Revolution as Europe’s first total war, he 
does not mean to suggest that they inaugurated an era of total war. This seeming incongruity 
actually makes the transformative effect of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars more apparent. 
European politics is changed irreversibly by the violence the Revolution unleashed, to the extent 
that greater efforts would henceforth be made to insure that nothing similar happened again. The 
Concert of Europe was not dedicated to achieving perpetual peace. But the habits of consultation 
and consensus that it promoted were certainly intended to avert the renewed outbreak of general 
war, a task at which it enjoyed substantial success, for a time. Mark Twain, writing in 1873 about 
the American Civil War—another appalling bloodbath with a plausible but contested claim to 
totality—noted that the Civil War had deliberately been fought in a way that “uprooted institutions 
that were centuries old, changed the politics of a people, … and wrought so profoundly upon the 
national character that the influence cannot be measured short of two or three generations.”[2] 
This statement seems to me no less true of the European war that David Bell has surveyed. 
In the European case, unfortunately, we know that once those two or three generations had 
passed, the genie of total war, made incalculably stronger thanks to the resourcefulness of 
European industry, would finally escape the magic bottle of instrumental rationality within which 
the statesmen and strategists of the nineteenth century had sought to imprison it, laying waste to 
the continent on a scale that even Napoleon could not have imagined. Yet even knowing this, I 
wonder if it is true, as Professor Bell argues, that the same “intellectual transformations” that gave 
the wars of the Revolution their transgressive character have “shaped the way Western societies 
have seen and engaged in military conflict” ever since.[3] It does not seem to me that the 
entanglement of total war and modernity that began in the Revolutionary era, and reached its 
apotheosis in the World Wars of the twentieth century, has proven permanent. 
On the contrary, in our own time, as Hew Strachan has observed,[4] modern war and total war 
have ceased to be synonymous, to the point where states most capable of waging modern war—
war fought by highly-trained professionals, employing the most advanced weapons, sensors, 
managerial techniques, and so on—are those least likely to embark upon total war, or to be 
required to fight it by their adversaries. They may impose it upon weaker and less capable 
opponents, however, by compelling them to choose between total war and capitulation; and they 
have often done so, inadvertently or not. This is particularly apparent in the recent history of the 
United States, a point that I raise only because I think it is apparent that recent events have 
played some part in inspiring Professor Bell’s book. The United States is the state best able to 
wage modern war in its most advanced form, and perhaps for that reason the most disposed to 
seize upon it as an instrument of policy. The bellicosity of American foreign policy in recent years 
does not seem to me to be connected to any disposition toward total war, but rather to the high 
confidence of America’s political and military leadership that total war will not be required for them 
to have their way. However one may judge the consequences of their conduct, I believe we must 
all hope that they are right about that.  
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